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It is only by ﬁxing on agreed meanings of terms in biomedical terminologies that we will be in a position to achieve that accumulation
and integration of knowledge that is indispensable to progress at the frontiers of biomedicine. Standardly, the goal of ﬁxing meanings is
seen as being realized through the alignment of terms on what are called concepts. Part I addresses three versions of the concept-based
approach—by Cimino, by Wu¨ster, and by Campbell and associates—and surveys some of the problems to which they give rise, all of
which have to do with a failure to anchor the terms in terminologies to corresponding referents in reality. Part II outlines a new, realist
solution to this anchorage problem, which sees terminology construction as being motivated by the goal of alignment not on concepts but
on the universals (kinds, types) in reality and thereby also on the corresponding instances (individuals, tokens). We outline the realist
approach and show how on its basis we can provide a benchmark of correctness for terminologies which will at the same time allow
a new type of integration of terminologies and electronic health records. We conclude by outlining ways in which the framework thus
deﬁned might be exploited for purposes of diagnostic decision-support.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The language of medicine is in constant ﬂux. And while
human beings can cope quite well with changing patterns
of use and meaning of biomedical terms, when computers
enter the scene then familiar problems arise. The orthodox
approach to solving these problems, which is illustrated by
almost all the terminologies integrated together in the
Metathesaurus of the Uniﬁed Medical Language System
(UMLS) [1], rests on the view that the ﬁxation of meanings
is best brought about through the alignment of terminolo-
gies on what are called concepts.
As can be gauged by the number of inﬂuential terminol-
ogies developed in its wake, this concept orientation was1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2005.09.005
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E-mail address: phismith@buﬀalo.edu.in some respects an important step forward in terminology
development, in that it resolved many unfortunate features
of the treatment of terms in the vocabularies of an earlier
era. Most recently—as in the GALEN project [2] and in
the SNOMED Clinical Terms vocabulary [3]—it has facil-
itated the application of tools such as Description Logic to
the task of formalizing concept deﬁnitions in ways that can
be used for automatic processing and quality assurance of
terminologies.
On the other side, however, the concept orientation is
beset with a number of fundamental diﬃculties, the most
important of which is that the term concept is used in so
many diﬀerent, sometimes highly counterintuitive, ways that
it is diﬃcult to knowpreciselywhat ismeant by this term even
when it is used by the same author and in the same paper.
Four loose families of views can be distinguished, which
we can refer to as the linguistic, the psychological, the
epistemological, and the ontological, respectively. On the
linguistic view, concepts are general terms whose meanings
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the view, they are these meanings themselves). On the psy-
chological view, concepts are mental entities, analogous to
ideas or beliefs. On the epistemological view, concepts are
units of knowledge (as the latter term is used in phrases such
as knowledge representation, knowledge modeling,
knowledge-based systems, and the like). And on the onto-
logical view, concepts are universals, kinds, attributes or
properties (i.e., they are something like general invariant
patterns) on the side of entities in the world.
Each one of these views might, in and of itself, be in a
position to sustain a coherent methodology for the ﬁxation
of meanings in terminologies. As we shall see, however, ele-
ments of all four views are to be found mixed together in
diﬀerent combinations in the standard literature, in ways
which provide strong evidence for the thesis that no single
reading of the term concept can sustain all of the expecta-
tions which have become associated with its use [4].
2. Ciminos desiderata
Ciminos [5] important paper advances a set of desider-
ata which must be satisﬁed by medical terminologies if they
are to be able to support computer applications, based on
the central idea that those involved in terminology work
should focus their attentions, not on terms or expressions
or on associated meanings, but rather on what are called
concepts. As Cimino puts it, it is concepts that should
serve as the unit of symbolic processing in the construc-
tion of terminologies.
Cimino himself comes close to embracing a linguistic
view of concepts. A concept, he says, is an embodiment
of a particular meaning, which means that it is something
like a term that has been extricated from the ﬂow of lan-
guage change. This reﬂects the desideratum of concept per-
manence to the eﬀect that the meaning of a concept, once
created, should be inviolate.
Three further desiderata distinguished by Cimino are:
• the concepts which form the nodes of the terminology must
correspond to at least one meaning (non-vagueness),
• they must correspond to no more than one meaning (non-
ambiguity),
• these meanings must themselves correspond to no more
than one concept (non-redundancy).
The concepts which form the nodes of a well-constructed
terminology will, if these requirements are met, be mapped
in one-one fashion to corresponding meanings.
Concepts as conceived by Cimino are thus in some
respects analogous to WordNets synsets, which are collec-
tions of word-forms substitutable for each other without
change of truth-value in given types of sentential contexts
[6]. Concepts thus understood stand in diﬀerent kinds of
meaning-relations: is narrower in meaning than, is broader
in meaning than, and so forth. Cimino, however, follows
a usage now common in work on biomedical terminologiesin speaking of concepts as being linked together also by
ontological relations such as caused by or site of or treated
with. He thereby embraces—simultaneously with the lin-
guistic view—elements of the ontological view, according
to which concepts would be abstractions from entities in
reality (at one point in the text he refers even to protons
as low-level concepts ([5], text to note 28)).
The ontological view has advantages over the linguistic
view above all when it comes to understanding the ways
the expressions in medical terminologies are in fact used
by clinicians in making diagnoses. Cimino himself provides
only one small hint in this connection, when he refers to the
concept diabetes mellitus becoming associated with a dia-
betic patient. Presumably, this association does not come
about because the physician has the patient on his left,
and the concept (term, meaning) on his right, and decides
that the two are ﬁtted together to stand in some not further
speciﬁed association relation. Rather, there is something
about the patient, something in reality, which the clinician
apprehends and which makes it true that this given concept
can be applied to this given case. Fatefully, however, like
other proponents of the concept orientation, Cimino does
not address this what it is on the side of the patient which
would warrant ontologically the assertion that an associa-
tion of the given sort obtains—he does not, in other words,
address the issue of what it is in the world to which bio-
medical concepts such as diabetes mellitus would
correspond.
3. International standard bad philosophy
Ciminos reluctance is understandable. When concepts
are pressed into service to perform incompatible roles—
as standing both in relations like narrower in meaning than
and in relations like treats or causes—then it becomes dif-
ﬁcult to determine what, exactly, concepts might be and
thus also diﬃcult to specify in a coherent way how they
might relate to actual clinical cases.
We can derive some illumination as to how this pass was
reached, if we look back to the origins of the concept ori-
entation in terminology work in the 1930s, when the Aus-
trian engineer and businessman Eugen Wu¨ster began to
develop the astonishingly inﬂuential theory of terms and
concepts which later became entrenched as the terminology
standard promulgated by ISO, the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization [7].
Wu¨ster himself defended a psychological view of con-
cepts, here echoing the views on the relations between
thoughts (=Wu¨sters concepts), words, and things articu-
lated by Ogden and Richards [8] in the form of the so-
called Semantic Triangle. Thus, Wu¨ster held that words
or symbols have direct reference not to things in reality
but rather always only to concepts, which means to certain
element of thought existing in the minds of human subjects.
Indeed, Wu¨ster sometimes writes as if, in order to appre-
hend concepts, we would need to gain access to the interi-
ors of each others brains:
290 B. Smith / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 39 (2006) 288–298If a speakerwishes todraw the attentionof an interlocutor
to a particular individual object, which is visible to both
parties or which he carries with him, he only has to point
to it, or, respectively, show it. If the object, however, is in
another place, it is normally impossible to produce it for
the purpose of showing it. In this case the only thing
available is the individual concept of the object, provided
that it is readily accessible in the heads of both persons. [9]
An individual concept is (Wu¨ster says) a memory of an
individual object which can serve as its mental surrogate.
His examples are: ‘‘Napoleon’’ or the concept of my foun-
tain pen. A general concept, analogously, for example
rabbit or fruit, is a mental surrogate of a plurality of
objects [7]. General concepts reﬂect similarities between
objects which human beings are able to apprehend through
perceptual experience and store in memory. They are
human creations, arising as the cumulative reﬂection of
what Wu¨ster repeatedly insists are arbitrary choices made
by humans in grouping objects together.
The perceived similarities which serve as starting points
for such groupings are reiﬁed by Wu¨ster under the heading
of what he calls characteristics, a term which, like the term
concept, has been embraced by the terminology community
(and has thereby also fallen prey to a variety of conﬂicting
interpretations). In some passages Wu¨ster himself identiﬁes
characteristics with properties on the side of the objects in
reality. In others, he identiﬁes them as further concepts, so
that they too would exist in the heads of human beings [7].
The same uncomfortable straddling of the realm of
mind (ideas, thoughts, and meanings) and world (objects
and their properties) shows up in Wu¨sters treatment of
the extension of a concept, which he deﬁnes alternatively
as the totality of all individual objects which fall under a
given concept and as the totality of all subordinated con-
cepts. Thus, on the one hand the extension of the concept
pneumonia would be the totality of cases (or, in philoso-
pher-speak, of instances) of pneumonia; on the other hand
it would be a collection of more speciﬁc concepts (bacterial
pneumonia, viral pneumonia, mycoplasma pneumonia, inter-
stitial pneumonia, horse pneumonia, and so on).
The unclarity of Wu¨sters thinking is reﬂected also in
his deﬁnition of object as anything to which human
thought is or can be directed, a deﬁnition which has
unfortunately been given normative standing through its
incorporation in diﬀerent versions in many ISO standards.
Thus, ISO 1087-1:2000 deﬁnes an object as anything per-
ceivable or conceivable, providing therewith the following
Note: Objects may be material (e.g., an engine, a sheet of
paper, a diamond), immaterial (e.g., conversion ratio, a
project plan) or imagined (e.g., a unicorn) [10]. Similarly,
Wu¨sters deﬁnition of object would seem to imply that
the extension of the concept pneumonia should be allowed
to include not only your and my pneumonia but also, for
example, cases of unicorn pneumonia or of pneumonia in
Russian ﬁction.With this, I believe, ISO undercuts any view of the rela-
tion between concepts and corresponding objects in reality
that might be compatible with the needs of empirical sci-
ence (where it is important to recognize that an imagined
mammal is not a special kind of mammal). It thereby also
cuts us oﬀ from any coherent understanding of that what it
is on the side of reality to which the concepts used in bio-
medicine or other scientiﬁc disciplines would correspond.4. Castles in the air
A further illustration of the problems associated with
the concept orientation is provided by Campbell et al. in
[11], in which they present their account of the status of
the UMLS in current terminology work.
The UMLS gathers into a single compendium terms from
diﬀerent vocabularies with the goal of creating uniﬁed
meaning across terminologies. The problem is that it does
this evenwhere the termsderived from separate source termi-
nologies clearly have diﬀerent extensions in this, the actual
world, as for example when it assigns (in early versions of
the UMLS) the same concept unique identiﬁer (CUI) both
to aspirin and to a proprietary form of chewable aspirin
called Aspergum.
The thesis of [11] is that this is allowed because theUMLS
is a Possible World (the authors cite in this connection the
work of Leibniz), in which aspirin and Aspergum do
indeed refer to one and the same thing—and this in spite
of the fact that many clinicians would not regard diﬀerent
formulations of aspirin ... as interchangeable concepts in
the prescriptions they write. But in what sense is the world
thus deﬁned possible, given that it would have to be governed
by laws of nature diﬀerent from those in operation here on
earth? The answer is that it is possible, at best, as an artifact
inhabiting that same strangeWu¨sterian realm in which aspi-
rin may be an abstract concept. In [11], the UMLS is
accordingly referred to as an artiﬁcial world, as contrasted
with our corporeal world of ﬂesh and blood entities.
The job of this artiﬁcial world is asserted to be that of
providing a link between the realm in which we live and
the symbolic world in which computer programs operate.
To achieve this end, accordingly, we need to distinguish
three worlds:
1. the possible (artiﬁcial) world which is the UMLS,
2. the symbolic world of computers,
3. the corporeal world in which we live.
Given that so much hangs on fulﬁllment of the task of
knowledge integration in biomedicine, linking worlds 2.
and 3. together would be a valuable achievement indeed.
But how is this linkage to be eﬀected? By appeal, surely,
to the extensions of the concepts in the UMLS, understood
as collections of particular entities (actual patients, actual
pains in actual heads, and actual pieces of Aspergum
chewed) in the corporeal world. The authors themselves
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embrace the standard Fregean interpretation of extension,
according to which (as they interpret [12]):the ‘‘meaning’’ of expressions can be divided into two
components: On the one hand there are the physical
objects to which the expression refers (the expressions
extensional component) and on the other there are the
characteristic features of the physical object used to iden-
tify it (the expressions intensional component). Under-
standing the interrelationship between intensional and
extensional meaning is essential to understanding the
‘‘senses’’ of meaning represented within the UMLS. Only
with this understanding canwe knowwhen symbols (such
as morning star and evening star) can be substituted for
one another without loss of truth. [11, single quotation
marks added]
When it comes to the UMLS itself, however, they aban-
don this Fregean reading in favor of a view according to
which (if we have understood their formulations correctly)
the extensions of the concepts in the UMLS would be sets
of concepts drawn from source terminologies:the developers [of the UMLS] collected the language
that others had codiﬁed into terminologic systems, pro-
vided a framework where the intension (connotation) of
terms of those systems could be preserved, and uniﬁed
those systems [into one uniﬁed system] by providing a
representation of extensional meaning by collecting
abstract concepts into sets that can be interpreted to rep-
resent their extension.
They then assert that:These extensional sets are codiﬁed by the Concept
Unique Identiﬁer (CUI) in the UMLS. We argue that
the ‘‘meaning’’ of this identiﬁer is only understandable
extensionally, by examining the characteristics shared
by all abstract concepts linked by a CUI.
If the extension of a UMLS concept is not a set of
instances in reality but rather a set of concepts, then the
term extension has come to mean what is ordinarily
called intension. With this reinterpretation, however,
our authors have denied themselves the possibility of a
conception of the UMLS as providing the desired link be-
tween the symbolic dimension of computer programs and
the domain of real-world entities. For by abstracting the
extensions of UMLS concepts away from corresponding
instances, they have also left themselves no means of giv-
ing an account of how these concepts would relate to the
what it is on the side of reality that is addressed by clini-
cians and biomedical researchers when they use the corre-
sponding terms.
5. The birth of the UMLS
It is a subsidiary goal of [11] to provide a theoretical-
ly illuminating account of how the UMLS came to beconstructed. Here, we must bear in mind that the state
of its source terminologies was often not such that the
creators of the UMLS could ascertain what characteris-
tics had been associated with the concepts in these termi-
nologies just by looking at the corresponding terms. The
proposal of [11] is that the creators of the UMLS were
able to tease out the relevant information by examining
certain clues left behind in the course of terminology
construction:When developers of source terminologies developed their
systems, they had very speciﬁc thoughts about what the
individual terms meant (in the intensional sense) with
respect to the terminology they were developing and the
human beings who would interact with those systems.
Although we cannot directly know what was in the minds
of the developers of the source terminologies, the UMLS
developers have used clues embodiedwithin the sources to
try to infer what those thoughts were and to try to codify
those thoughts within the UMLS.
ICD-10, for example, includes ‘‘C75.0: parathyroid
gland,’’ a term which on the face of it belongs to the
domain of anatomy. However, the associated parent term
C75, which reads: ‘‘malignant neoplasm of other endocrine
glands and related structures,’’ provides a better clue to
what the developers of ICD-10 really had in mind with
C75.0. In building the UMLS, accordingly, care was taken
to ensure that the code C75.0 would be linked to the
UMLS CUI for ‘‘malignant neoplasm of parathyroid
gland’’ and not to that for ‘‘parathyroid gland.’’ (More
recently, the string or term corresponding in ICD-10 to
C75.0 has additionally been marked in the UMLS as lack-
ing face validity.)
Ref. [11] tells us that the clues which served as basis for
making such decisions took several forms:the term used by a source to describe the thought; the
synonyms used by a source to describe other statements
that its developers considered equivalent to the thought;
and any formal or informal relationships used by the
developers to relate terms within the terminologic sys-
tem to one another. Some of the informal relationships
had to be inferred [by the creators of the UMLS] from
processing the typesetting tapes for a particular source,
using constructs such as how many tabs appeared before
the word, whether the word was in bold or italics, and
what page of the printed book the word occurred on.
The methodology described by Campbell et al. [11] thus
presupposes a distinction between two sorts of clues left
behind by the developers of UMLS source terminologies:
those which do indeed reveal what the latter had in mind,
and those which reveal merely aspects of their thinking
clouded over by the bad term-formation principles which
the UMLS needed to correct for. The two sorts of clues
do not, of course, come ready labeled as such. If the pro-
posed methodology is truly to have been applicable in
coherent fashion, therefore, then the creators of the UMLS
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from bad. Note that the concept orientation cannot itself
provide us with any help in understanding how they were
able to carry out this task. For it is precisely concepts that
are supposed to have served as both input and output when
the methodology in question was being applied, and this
means there is no way in which concepts themselves could
have served also as benchmark of correctness.
How, then, were the creators of the UMLS able to ﬁnd
their way successfully through the mass of clues left behind
by their predecessors? One intuitively appealing answer is
this: that they were able to recognize the good clues
because they were implicitly taking into account that cor-
poreal world to which the corresponding terms were, how-
ever, inchoately, pointing. That it was, in other words,
precisely the real world of real biomedical phenomena,
with which physicians are familiar from their training
and everyday experience, which played the role of measure
of correctness for their coding choices.
6. How terms are introduced into the language of
biomedicine
The realist orientation in biomedical terminology devel-
opment is the result, now, of generalizing this simple pro-
posal. It consists in the view that terms in terminologies
(treated straightforwardly as linguistic items, as strings of
certain special sorts) are to be aligned not on concepts
but rather on entities in reality. This realist orientation
has a small but growing band of defenders, which includes
the authors of the Foundational Model of Anatomy [13]
together with members of the Gene Ontology [14] and
Open Biomedical Ontologies [15] consortia collaborating
together in the National Center for Biomedical Ontology
[16]. The proposal on which it rests now needs to be care-
fully unpacked if it is to fulﬁll its promise.
Consider, to ﬁx our ideas, how new biomedical terms are
formed, for example when a new disorder ﬁrst begins to
make itself manifest. Slowly, through the oﬃcial and unof-
ﬁcial cooperation of physicians and other involved parties,
a view begins to become established to the eﬀect that a cer-
tain family of cases, manifesting a certain newly apparent
constellation of symptoms, represents instances of a hither-
to unrecognized kind. We are confronted, therefore, with a
phenomenon involving both real-world instances and also
the biomedical kinds which these instantiate.
A kind is, for the realist, a part of reality: it corresponds
to what philosophers call a universal, or in other words to
an invariant pattern in reality which is multiply exempliﬁed
in an indeﬁnitely extendable range of diﬀerent instances. It
is such universals which, by allowing us to describe multi-
ple particulars using one and the same general term, make
science possible. Such universals also make science-based
clinical care possible, as they allow uniform treatments
and associated clinical guidelines to be applied to plurali-
ties of disorders diagnosed to be of like kind. And it is uni-
versals, too, which make terminologies possible.The problem, of course, is that it is in many cases diﬃ-
cult to establish what universals or kinds given particulars
are instances of. Again, when a disease universal ﬁrst
begins to make itself manifest it will still hardly be under-
stood. Something similar applies when a new virus or gene
is ﬁrst detected, or a new kind of biochemical reaction in
the cell. While, in regard to each individual case, users of
the term may know precisely what they are referring to—
they can point to it in the lab or clinic—it may be diﬃcult
to convey this information to others. This is because the
user has a clear understanding of what the term designates
in reality, but only at the level of instances and not yet at
the level of universals.
With increasing understanding of what universal given
instances have in common, however, the new term becomes
entrenched as a means to refer to the corresponding family
of cases, which itself begins to be apprehended as the exten-
sion of the corresponding universal (sometimes also called
the class of its instances).
Those involved come to an agreement to use from here
on(1) this term
for: (2) these instances
of: (3) this kind.Against the background of the concept orientation,
however, there is postulated also:
(4) a new concept,
together with
(5) a deﬁnition.
If (4) is simply a chosen privileged term, or a WordNet-
style synset, or some handy shorthand for a grouping
together of terms in diﬀerent natural languages which are
allowed to be used as translations or synonyms of a given
selected term, and if deﬁnitions under (5) are promulgated
only after the point where the corresponding universal is
properly understood in terms of necessary and suﬃcient
conditions, then little harm is done by the postulation of
(4) and (5). Responding, however, to the edicts of ISO
and of healthcare messaging and W3C-style standards
bodies, and to the needs of computer programmers, term-
inologists have come to see (4) and (5) as oﬀering a new
and special realm for exploration, the realm of concepts.
Concepts and deﬁnitions come thereby to be de-anchored
from the world of universals and their instances and they
begin to acquire a life of their own.
One advantage of this move for terminologists is that it
can be ensured that each and every general term p has its
own precisely tailored referent—called the concept p—a
referent that is guaranteed to exist even when the term in
question (unicorn, phlogiston) has no application to
either universals or instances in reality. One disadvantage,
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coming to grips with the universals in reality (in this our
corporeal world), because it substitutes instead the much
weaker goal of reaching consensus on the use of words.
It then postulates entities called concepts wherever such
consensus has been reached.
Matters are complicated still further by the fact that, on
the ontological reading of concept, concepts themselves
come close to being identiﬁed with universals in reality.
And because there are traces of this ontological reading
underlying many uses of the term concept in the standard
literature, proponents of the concept orientation may ﬁnd
it diﬃcult to understand why it is necessary to insist so
forcefully on the distinction between concepts and
universals.
One reason is precisely the very many terms in biomed-
ical terminologies which have been associated too readily
with concepts even though they correspond to no universal
in reality. There are no universals corresponding, for exam-
ple, to UMLS terms such as
probable suicide
possible tubo-ovarian abscess
other European in New Zealand
gallbladder calculus without mention of cholecystitis
atypical squamous cells of uncertain signiﬁcance, proba-
bly benign.
Such terms represent not entities in reality as they exist in
advance of and independently of our testing and measuring
and inquiring activity. Indeed, they represent nothing in
reality at all. Rather, they are disguised assertions about
our ways of gaining knowledge of or referring to entities
of other types in speciﬁc kinds of contexts [17].
More important, however, is the fact that where,
according to the concept orientation, the meanings of
terms in a terminology would belong to a realm whose
denizens exist as products of agreement, according to
the realist orientation they belong to a realm which exists
prior to and independently of any agreements we are
able to make. According to the concept orientation, if
practitioners have agreed that two terms have diﬀerent
meanings, then they do indeed have diﬀerent meanings.
According to the realist orientation, it is possible that
we discover that two terms (Bilharzia/Schistosomiasis;
morning star/evening star) mean the same thing, for
example because diﬀerentiating (clinical; astronomical)
manifestations were initially misinterpreted. Nothing in
the realm of concepts, or of the ideas or beliefs of lan-
guage users, can inform us of this coincidence; rather it
takes arduous inquiry, directed at reality itself. We must
thus rely at every stage on the instances in the world and
on the patterns of similarities between them to tell us
what the meanings of our general terms are, in an empir-
ical process of discovery that is never brought to an end
[18,19]. This implies that, where the concept orientation
views terminology development as eﬀectively a linguisticexercise (it is, again, a matter of coming to agreement
on words), the realist orientation views terminology
development as associated much more closely with the
advance of science on the basis of reality itself as
benchmark.
Part II. Grounding biomedical terminologies in clinical
reality
7. Tracking referents
While universals and instances exist independently of
our human cognitive activities, terminologies and clinical
records are, like scientiﬁc theories, human creations. Each
terminology should represent the universals about which
the consensus of researchers in its domain believes itself
to have gained knowledge at the stage when the terminol-
ogy is created. Each clinical record should represent what
its compilers believe about the corresponding cases in light
of (and in some cases of course also in spite of) the termi-
nologies they are using at the stage when the clinical record
is created.
Terminologies and clinical records are connected togeth-
er through single cases (instances), and it is the totality of
such cases in reality which serves as benchmark of correct-
ness for both. Our task is to ﬁnd a means of understanding
this fact theoretically, but in such a way that our under-
standing can be exploited for the practical purposes of
healthcare and biomedical research.
The idea, simply put, is to devise an approach which will
allow terminologies to be built up from what the physician
is confronted by at the point of care. To this end we need to
engineer a shift of focus in terminology construction to
particular medically salient entities of a range of diﬀerent
types, including both objects, such as cells or fractures or
inﬂammations, and processes, such as disease histories, ris-
es in temperature, or the clottings of particular portions of
blood.
Major terminologies such as ICD-10 or SNOMED CT
already comprehend a wide variety of diﬀerent kinds or
categories of universals in the realms of disorders, symp-
toms, pathological and non-pathological anatomical struc-
tures, acts of human beings (for example anesthetizings,
observings, interpretings of symptoms), biological process-
es (for example processes of digestion, movement, develop-
ment, growth, aging), and many more. And while, for each
of the latter, there is a family of particulars which instanti-
ate the corresponding universals, these instances them-
selves are, under existing EHR regimes, not directly
entered in a clinical record.
This is because existing systems for keeping track of
clinical phenomena allow direct reference to just a small
number of types of particulars, normally just to (i) human
beings (patients, care-providers, family members, via prop-
er names or via alphanumeric patient IDs), (ii) times and
(iii) places at which actions are performed or observations
made [20,21].
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means that no adequate means is available to keep track of
one and the same particular (for example a speciﬁc wound
or tumor) over an extended period of time. When interpret-
ing health record data, it is accordingly diﬃcult to distin-
guish clearly between multiple examples of the same
particular and multiple particulars of the same general kind
[20]. The same limitation also places obstacles in the way of
drawing reliable inferences, for example for public health
purposes, from the existence of diﬀerent instances of the
same clinical universal in diﬀerent patients [21].
Under present EHR regimes, when the need arises to
refer in diﬀerent contexts to some single particular as it
exists at diﬀerent points in time, each such reference must
be created anew, via some combination of general terms
(or associated codes) with designators for persons, times
and places, for example in expressions like: the fever of
patient #1001 observed by physician #4001 at time #9001
in hospital ward #7001. Unfortunately, such composites,
even where they are formulated by the same physicians
using the same general terms deriving from the same cod-
ing systems, constitute barriers to reasoning about the cor-
responding particular entities in software systems. (Imagine
a regime for reasoning about human beings as they change
and develop and move about over time in which people
could be referred to only by means of expressions like:
patient in third bed from left, or person discharged after
appendectomy, or relative of probable smoker.)
In [20,21] we have proposed a method by means of
which the corresponding instances would be made directly
visible to reasoning systems without need for prior process-
ing. This involves the creation of a new sort of EHR regime
in which explicit alphanumerical identiﬁers—analogues of
proper names—would be as far as possible automatically
assigned in the course of data entry to individual real-world
entities at the point where they ﬁrst become relevant to the
treatment of the corresponding patients. Such instance
unique identiﬁers (IUIs) would be assigned to instances
of universals in all the diagnostically salient categories
recorded in a clinical record as a means of doing justice
to the what it is on the side of the patient in all its richness
and complexity. In this way, they can serve to tie together
diﬀerent views of one and the same instance of a given dis-
order which may become incorporated into the record, for
example when physician A writes tumor and physician B
writes CAAA12. They can thereby also, as we shall see,
help to solve the anchorage problem—the problem of
explaining how terms in terminologies can be anchored
to corresponding referents in reality. For the use of IUIs
would allow us to identify the corresponding particulars
both in written records and in computer representations
in a way which would make it clear when diﬀerent physi-
cians or biomedical researchers in diﬀerent disciplines are
referring to one and the same particular. The cumulative
result of such use would then amount to a giant, growing,
map-like representation of the particulars in the healthcare
domain and of the interrelations between them.8. Understanding terminology revision
As in the past, so also at every foreseeable stage in the
future, terminologies and clinical records will be subject
to the need for correction of errors. Note, however, that
this recognition of the need for constant revision on both
the terminology (universal) and EHR (instance) levels goes
hand in hand with another component of the realist orien-
tation, according to which both the vast and settled major-
ity of the beliefs expressed or presupposed in biomedical
texts, and the vast majority of assertions captured in clini-
cal records, are both true and uncontroversial. (It is not
controversial, for example, that the terms parathyroid
gland and malignant neoplasm of the parathyroid gland
refer to two diﬀerent entities in reality.) It is also compati-
ble with another (surely also correct) view according to
which the sum total of true beliefs of both kinds is con-
stantly increasing, so that there is, in biomedicine as in
other ﬁelds of science, a broad accumulation of knowledge.
The phenomenon of constant revision tells us, however,
that mixed in with the knowledge that is captured in termi-
nologies and in clinical records there is at every stage a
small and ever-changing admixture of false belief. The part
of this admixture which most concerns us here takes the
form of terms in a terminology which are associated with
a claim to refer to some corresponding universal but where
this claim is not fulﬁlled. This can be either because there is
no universal at all which can serve as referent of the term in
question, or because the term refers ambiguously to what is
in fact a plurality of universals. This means that the realist
counterparts of the three central Cimino desiderata:
• each term in a terminology must correspond to at least
one universal (non-vagueness),
• each term must correspond to no more than one univer-
sal (non-ambiguity),
• each universal must itself correspond to no more than
one term (non-redundancy),
should be accepted only as long-term goals, to the ever
closer but never quite complete realization of which termi-
nologists are condemned. In moving towards the realiza-
tion of these goals, they must follow always in the coat-
tails of those engaged in empirical research in attempts to
expand our knowledge of biomedical universals and their
instantiations.
The proper understanding of terminologies and EHR
systems must accordingly take account of the dynamic nat-
ure of both types of artifacts. Moreover, they must do this
in such a way as to recognize two levels of dynamism,
reﬂecting changes in reality and changes in our scientiﬁc
beliefs about reality, which implies the need to keep track
of time in two diﬀerent ways. This idea involves nothing
that is essentially new: our EHRs already track events of
many sorts by indexing with times; and we track changes
in terminologies (which here go proxy for corresponding
beliefs) by means of version numbers. The relative indepen-
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that we can in principle direct a version of a terminology
created today to the task of classifying or reclassifying
instances existing a week or a decade or 5000 years ago.
9. Terminologies: a formal treatment
We can now deﬁne a terminology, more technically, as a
graph-theoretic object consisting of nodes joined together
by links, the whole indexed by version number. More pre-
cisely, a terminology is an ordered triple:
T ¼ hN ; L; vi;
where N itself is a set of triples Æp,Sp,dæ, called nodes, with p
a unique label (which may be either some alphanumeric
identiﬁer or what is sometimes called a preferred term),
Sp a set {s, s
0, s00, . . .} of synonyms (including alphanumeric
codes in systems like SNOMED CT), and d an (optional)
deﬁnition (the precise format and standing of which we
can here leave out of account), L is a set of ordered pairs
Ær,Lræ, called links, consisting of a relation designation r
(is_a, part_ of, etc.), together with a set Lr of ordered
pairs Æs, s 0æ of those terms for which s r s 0 represents a con-
sensus assertion of biomedical science about corresponding
universals (if any) at the time when the given terminology is
prepared, and v is a version number, which encodes this
time.
The variables p, s, d, r, v, . . . range over syntactic enti-
ties (strings of characters in some regimented language).
Importantly, some values of s, s 0, . . . will correspond to
no universal in reality. (Like unicorn or phlogiston they
will be empty names, which correspond to nothing in reality
at all.) Others will correspond to too much on the side of
reality (i.e., they will refer ambiguously to a plurality of
universals). Every terminology will in this sense be marked
by two kinds of defect, both of which must be taken into
account when we consider the whole terminology
T = ÆN,L,væ in light of its status as a (partial) map of an
analogous structure of universals in the corporeal world.
Our approach thus diﬀers radically from the standard
approaches evinced by the majority of terminologies in
the UMLS Metathesaurus, which skirt round both kinds
of defect by postulating concepts to serve as precisely tai-
lored referents wherever needed. This means, however, that
the curators of these terminologies are unable to come to
grips with the ways in which clinical reality can serve as
benchmark both for the correctness of terminologies in
the large, and for the correctness of local applications of
terminologies to particular cases in the small.
In what follows we shall be concerned almost exclusively
with the set N as this exists in modiﬁed form in successive
versions of a single terminology. While in the ideal state of
terminological virtue we could indeed associate the nodes
in N in one-one fashion with the universals in the corre-
sponding domain of reality, really existing terminologies
fall short of this ideal in the three ways identiﬁed in our
realist counterparts of Ciminos criteria of non-vagueness,non-ambiguity, and non-redundancy above. This means
(roughly, and for our present purposes) that at any given
stage these nodes will in and of themselves be divided into
three groups:
N ¼ N 1 [ N> [ N<;
where N1 consists of those nodes in N which correspond to
exactly one universal, N> of those nodes which correspond
to more than one universal (in various combinations), and
N< of those nodes which correspond to less than one uni-
versal, which means in practice to no universal at all.
It is an assumption of scientiﬁc realism that, with the
passage of time, N> and N< will become ever smaller, so
that N1 will approximate ever more closely to N. (This
assumption must be qualiﬁed in light of the fact that N will
change in reﬂection not only of changes in our knowledge,
but also of changes in the totality of biomedically salient
universals in the reality beyond. Changes of the latter sort
are pervasive for example in the domain of therapies,
reﬂecting advances in drug design, and in molecular biolo-
gy and related domains, reﬂecting advances in scientiﬁc
knowledge about proteins and other gene products. They
will not, however, aﬀect our argument here.)
Our knowledge of the successes of medical science gives
us strong reason to believe that, at any given advanced
stage in the development of a terminology, N1 will consti-
tute a large portion of N (N, remember, is a collection of
terms already in use among domain experts, each of which
is associated with the implicit or explicit claim to represent
a biomedical universal; remember, too, that N will stan-
dardly include very many uncontroversial terms such as
ear or cough or gland). At the same time, however,
our knowledge of the ways errors become locally manifest
in speciﬁc terminologies gives us reason to believe that we
have some way to go before N> and N< can be excised
completely.
Moreover, we know a priori that at no stage (prior to
that longed-for end to our labors that is forever out of
reach) will we know precisely where the boundaries are
to be drawn between N1, N>, and N<—that is, we will never
know precisely which portions of N consist of the low value
N>- and N<-type terms we are seeking to eliminate. The
reason for this is clear: if we did know where these low val-
ue terms were to be found, then we would already have the
resources needed to expand correspondingly the size of N1
and thus to move its boundaries to a position closer to
those of N.
This unavoidable lack of knowledge of the boundaries
of N1 is not a problem, however. For it is, after all, N,
and not N1, which is the focus of our practical labors. It
is N which represents our (putative) consensus knowledge
of the universals in the relevant domain of reality at any
given stage.
Even though we do not know how the terms are present-
ly distributed between the three groups, we shall see that
this does not mean that the distinction between N1, N>,
and N< terms is of purely theoretical interest—a matter
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signiﬁcance for the day-to-day work of terminology devel-
opment and application. For we shall see that it is this very
distinction which will provide us with the resources we need
to exploit instance data as benchmark for terminology
revision.
10. A framework for terminology reﬁnement
Consider once more our scenario concerning the way
in which a medical term is introduced into our language.
While the instances in our initial pool of cases, and certain
patterns of irregularities (deviations from the norm) which
they exemplify, are well known to the physicians involved,
the universal which they instantiate is as yet unknown.
The challenge is then to solve for this unknown (in some-
thing like the way in which astronomers postulated an
unknown heavenly body, later identiﬁed as Pluto, in order
to explain irregularities in the orbits of Uranus and Nep-
tune). And we can now see that three diﬀerent kinds of
solution can present themselves: the cases in the pool—
not patients, remember, but the corresponding particular
disorders—are (i) instances of exactly one universal, (ii)
instances of no universal at all, and (iii) instances of more
than one universal.
To see how we might make practical use of this idea, we
need to imagine, again, a future world of sophisticated elec-
tronic health records in which instances in all clinically sali-
ent categories are tracked by means of IUIs. Each IUI
would be associated with a vector, comprehending both
relevant assignments of preferred general terms in one or
more terminologies and also, utilizing the relational (L-)
component associated with N, cross-references to the IUIs
assigned to those other particulars (including the relevant
patients and medically salient attributes such as tempera-
ture, blood pressure, etc.) with which the entity under
scrutiny is related, for example in the ways catalogued in
[20–22].
We can then deﬁne an instance vector as an ordered
triple
hi; p; ti
consisting of a IUI i, a node p in a terminology, and a
string t designating a time at which the particular designat-
ed by i is asserted to be an instance of the universal (if any)
designated by p. (Here, and in what follows we refer to
nodes in N via their corresponding labels which we have
speciﬁed to be unique.) Such instance vectors reﬂect the
fact that the IUIs in our repository will typically already
have been associated at the point of entry into the EHR
with preferred terms or associated codes from one or more
terminologies. For example, the EHR will contain the
assertion that tumor instance #5001 is an instance of the
universal associated with the SNOMED-CT code for glo-
mus tumor (morphologic abnormality).
For a given set D of IUIs (gathered for example by a sin-
gle healthcare institution in a given time period), we cannow deﬁne a t-instantiation It (T,D) of a terminology
T = ÆN,L,væ as the set of all instance vectors Æi,p, tæ for i
in D and p in N. We can also deﬁne for each term p in T
its t-extension It (T,D) (p) as the set of all IUIs i for which
Æi,p, tæ is included in It (T,D). The t-extension then goes
proxy for (is a map of) the extension of the universal (if
any) designated by the node p in that particular domain
of reality which is selected for by D at time t. (In brief, it
comprehends all the known instances of p in the relevant
domain.)
For each node p we can now examine its t-extensions for
diﬀerent values of D and t, in order to determine statistical
patterns of diﬀerent sorts, taking into account also, for
each i, the other instance vectors in which i is involved
through the relations in which the corresponding instances
stand to other instances represented by IUIs in D. Three
alternative scenarios once again present themselves,
according to the status of each node p in relation to the
world of actual cases (the world which serves as benchmark
for the truth and falsity of our assertions):
1. p is in N1(there is a single universal designated by p): in
this case the instances in It (T,D) (p) share in common a
speciﬁc invariant pattern (which should be detectable
through the application of appropriate statistically
based tools),
2. p is in N> (p comprehends a plurality of universals, for
example in a manner analogous to the term diabetes):
in this case the instances in It (T,D) (p) manifest no com-
mon pattern, but they (or the bulk of them) can be par-
titioned into some small number of subsets in such a way
that the instances in each subset do instantiate such a
pattern,
3. p is in N< (p comprehends no universals): in this case the
instances in It (T,D) (p) manifest no common pattern and
there is no way of partitioning them (or the bulk of
them) into a combination of one or a small number of
subsets in such a way that all the instances in each subset
instantiate such a pattern.
On the basis of inspection of the ways in which diﬀerent
terms fall under one or other of these three headings we can
then subject terminologies, either manually or automatical-
ly, to evidence-based processes of reﬁnement and correc-
tion, picking out questionable terms which need to be
subjected to further testing and to subsequent deletion or
subdivision as necessary.
For a given disorder term p, we gauge whether p is in N1,
N> or N< by applying statistical measures to the similarities
between the vectors associated with each of the members of
relevant instantiations. If, for example, the measure of sim-
ilarity between such vectors is both roughly similar for all
members of a given instantiation and also roughly constant
across time, then this will constitute strong evidence for the
thesis that p is in N1. If, on the other hand, we ﬁnd high
similarity for some disorder term before a certain time t,
but much lower degrees of similarity after some later time
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itself undergone some form of mutation, and we can exper-
iment with adding new terms and then repartitioning the
available sets of IUIs in such a way as to reach once again
those high levels of similarity which are associated with the
N1 case.
11. Applications of the referent tracking methology
By allowing instances in reality to play the role of bench-
mark for the correctness of a terminology, the referent
tracking methodology can be used also in other ways.
Thus, on the (still highly speculative) scenario we are here
outlining, the gradual revision and reﬁnement of terminol-
ogies will in due course spawn, in the opposite direction,
better patient records through revision of the information
associated as vectors to each of the relevant IUIs, for
example when we discover that a given single disorder term
has thus far been applied incorrectly to what are in fact
instances of a plurality of distinct disorders. This will there-
by lead in turn to better quality clinical record data, which
may in turn spawn yet further revisions in our terminolo-
gies. Second, our methods for cross-calibrating terminolo-
gy and instance data might be used for purposes of decision
support in the process of diagnosis. For where instances in
reality are able to serve as global benchmark for the cor-
rectness of a terminology, then they can serve this role also
locally, at the point where the clinician is confronted with
the individual patient.
One goal of an adequate terminology-based reasoning
system in a world of abundant instance data would thus
be to allow the application of statistical tools, for example
tools for association rule mining [23], in the service of diag-
nostic decision-support. We can imagine a scenario in
which the clinician is able to experiment with alternative
diagnoses (which is to say: alternative term-assignments
to given collections of instance data) on the basis of mea-
surements of the statistical likelihood of given patterns of
association between terms and instances. We could imagine
also software which would allow clinicians to experiment
with alternative IUI assignments in those cases where it is
unclear whether successive clusters of symptoms of a given
patient should be counted as manifestations of a single or
of multiple disorders. The machinery of instantiations
could then be used by the clinician to test out alternative
hypotheses regarding how to classify given particulars, by
giving him the facility to experiment with diﬀerent scenar-
ios as concerns the division between N1, N<, and N< in rela-
tion to a given case, taking into account also oft-repeated
patterns of error in diagnosis made by physicians confront-
ed with analogous instance-data in the past. The goal is a
software tool which would allow statistical tuning of the
relevant local parts of a terminology to given instance-
based EHR data.
In the real world, of course, such methods will not be
able to be applied successfully in every case. For example,
we may not have all the data needed to convince a statisti-cal reasoner armed with a given stock of universal terms
and associated instance data that a given case meets the
requirements for any available diagnosis. This scenario is,
however, no diﬀerent from that which is often faced
already by the practicing physician, who must decide from
case to case how much data to collect (for example, how
often to take the temperature of a given patient) in order
to achieve a succession of better approximations to what
then establishes itself as a good diagnosis on the basis of
successful treatment.
The methodology can be used, ﬁnally, to support the
making of scientiﬁc discoveries. Suppose, for example, that
the length of a patients nose is correlated with a certain
speciﬁc disease, but that this fact is unknown to medical
science. Why should anyone start to register patient nose-
length in the way that we do now for, say, temperature
or blood pressure? The answer is that such data have been
collected already for the many hundreds of thousands of
patients who have undergone plastic surgery for cosmetic
nose corrections. In each such case, the length of the nose
is measured as a matter of course. Many of these patients
visited other physicians for totally diﬀerent problems
(before, at the same time, or later). If all the physicians
involved had been exploiting the potential of referent
tracking, then it would not be too diﬃcult to correlate these
data, just by using brute-force techniques such as cluster
analysis, principle component analysis, or factor analysis,
in order to tease out the correlation in question in just
the way that scientiﬁc discoveries are sometimes made on
the basis of statistical analyses of instance-level data in
other domains.
12. Conclusion
In the ideal case, a biomedical terminology would pro-
vide not merely the resources for assigning terms for uni-
versals to the instances in reality, but also a perspicuous
map of how these universals themselves are related
together in reality. As we conceive the EHR system of
the future, instance data will be to a large degree auto-
matically partitioned at the point of data entry in ways
reﬂecting the structure of the world of clinically relevant
universals, with alternative partitions included as options
in those cases where diagnosis is still uncertain. This par-
titioning of instances is currently masked from view in
the clinical record because the instance-level data that
exists in separate EHRs is accessible only via the detour
of reference to the individual patient. A regime for the
management of terminologies and clinical data along
the lines described in the foregoing, however, would
allow us to map directly the instances that are salient
to medical care in such a way as to mirror how the latter
are themselves related together in reality at the instance
level. In this way it would make possible a new level
of sophistication in reasoning about the what it is on
the side of the patient that is the primary focus of medical
care.
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